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ABSTRACT 
Political Institutions and  Income Inequality: The case of  
Decentralization 
by Pablo Beramendi1 
Political power is being reallocated across territorial boundaries. Traditionally centralized 
polities are either decentralized or on their way to decentralization. In addition, European 
nations are engaged in the process of building a common set of  rules both respectful to and 
compatible with their own peculiarities. As a result, the number of political entities in which 
several levels of government share a common economic space has increased. This paper 
analyzes how decentralization interacts with the politics of redistribution and inequality. The 
argument can be outlined as follows. Contrary to what is conventionally argued, 
decentralization per se does not necessarily lead towards higher (or lower) levels of income 
inequality. Whatever the impact of decentralization on the distribution of income may be, it is 
to a large extent a function of the internal structures of inequality within regions and their 
combination. Secondly, if decentralization indeed leads to different distributive outcomes, 
there are reasons to believe that, in the context of multilevel governance, contentions about 
the institutional design of redistribution are themselves contentions about who gets what. 
Such contentions make decentralization  endogenous to the territorial structure of inequality 
by virtue of a political process linking the latter to the preferences about the institutional 
design of redistribution. The first part of the paper formalizes this argument. The second one 
tests its main implications against a data set of 15 OECD countries over the period 1980-
1997. 
 
Keywords: Income Inequality; Decentralization; Redistribution Policy 
JEL Classification: H2, H3, D6 
                                                          
1  I appreciate comments and/or information from  Tony Atkinson, Thomas R. Cusack, 
Gösta Esping-Andersen, Kai Konrad, Jonas Pontusson,  Pieter Van Houten, Sig 
Vitols, Michael Wallerstein, Bruce Western and Chris Wlezien.  The usual disclaimer 
applies. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
 
Die Auswirkungen von Dezentralisierung auf Einkommensungleichheit  
 
Politische Macht wird über territoriale Grenzen hinaus neu verteilt. Traditionell zentralisierte 
Länder haben sich bereits dezentralisiert oder sind auf dem Wege der Dezentralisierung. 
Zusätzlich befinden sich die europäischen Nationen in einem Prozess des Aufbaus eines 
gemeinsamen Regelwerkes, das einerseits ihre eigenen Besonderheiten respektieren soll 
und andererseits mit diesen Besonderheiten vereinbar zu sein hat. Das Ergebnis ist eine 
Zunahme von politischen Gebilden, in denen sich mehrere Regierungsebenen einen 
gemeinsamen Wirtschaftsraum teilen. Dieser Artikel analysiert die Interaktion dieses 
Prozesses mit Verteilungspolitik sowie Ungleichheit und argumentiert dabei wie folgt: Im 
Gegensatz zur üblichen Sichtweise führt Dezentralisierung nicht notwendigerweise zu 
höheren (oder niedrigeren) Einkommensungleichheiten. Was immer die Auswirkung von 
Dezentralisierung auf Einkommensverteilung auch sein mag, so ist letztere zu einem großen 
Teil das Ergebnis der internen Ungleichheitsstrukturen von Regionen und deren 
verschiedenen Kombinationen. Und zweitens, wenn Dezentralisierung zu verschiedenen 
Verteilungsergebnissen führt, dann wäre zu vermuten, dass Konflikte über die institutionelle 
Ausgestaltung von Verteilungspolitik innerhalb eines Mehrebenensystems eigentlich 
Meinungsverschiedenheiten über die Frage des „Wer-bekommt-was“ sind. Auf Grund eines 
politischen Prozesses, der die territoriale Ungleichheit mit den Präferenzen bezüglich der 
institutionellen Ausgestaltung der Umverteilung zusammenschaltet, werden derartige 
Konflikte über die Dezentralisierung zu einem endogenen Problem der territorialen Struktur 
von Ungleichheit. Der erste Teil des Artikels befasst sich mit den eben genannten 
Argumenten. Der zweite Teil testet deren wesentlichen Implikationen anhand eines 
Datensatzes von 15 OECD-Ländern über den Zeitraum 1980 – 1997. 
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Introduction  
 
Political power is being reallocated across territorial boundaries. Traditionally 
centralized polities are either decentralized (Spain) or on their way to 
decentralization (UK), whilst formerly stable institutional agreements are being 
revisited in almost every federal country. Last but not least, European nations are 
engaged in the process of building a common set of rules both respectful to and 
compatible with their own peculiarities2. The arena for contentions about who gets  
what is being reshaped across advanced industrial societies. As a result, the number 
of political entities in which several levels of government share a common economic 
space has increased. This paper analyzes how decentralization interacts with the 
politics of redistribution and inequality.  
 
 The argument can be outlined as follows. If decentralization matters for the 
distribution of income, it is primarily because it politicizes territorial differences 
concerning the structure of inequality and the politics of redistribution. Put very 
briefly, decentralization, by increasing the number of actors with political capacity, 
alters the nature of the conflicts about who gets what. Whatever the impact of 
decentralization on the distribution of income may be, it is to a large extent a 
function of the internal structures of inequality within regions and their combination. 
For instance, if there is a "socialist" and a "conservative" region, then 
decentralization will increase redistribution in the former. All in all, this points to the 
fact that the effect of an institutional change on the overall levels of redistribution is 
contingent upon a number of determinants. Contrary to what is conventionally 
argued, decentralization per se does not necessarily lead towards higher (or lower) 
levels of income inequality. If alternative institutional designs make so much of a 
difference there are reasons to believe that, in the context of multilevel governance, 
contentions about the institutional design of redistribution are themselves contentions 
about who gets what. Thus, there is a second, hidden dimension to the relation 
between decentralization and inequality in so far as such contentions make 
decentralization  endogenous to the territorial structure of inequality.  
                                                          
2 For a review of these processes see Elazar (1994), OECD (1997), Wright and Hesse (1996) and 
Amoretti and Bermeo (eds.) (2003). 
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The remainder of the paper develops this argument in detail and provides 
empirical evidence to support it. The first section presents a succinct analysis of the 
distributive consequences of decentralization. On the basis of the implications of 
such analysis, section 2 develops a model in which the link between the territorial 
structure of inequality and the preferences about the territorial design of 
redistribution is identified. Thereafter, a number of hypotheses derived from this 
model are tested in section 3, exploiting a time-series cross sectional data set for 15 
OECD countries during the period 1980-1997. Finally, section 4 concludes. 
 
1.- Decentralization and the Distribution of Income 
 
Consider the simplest model of redistribution, as developed by Meltzer and 
Richard (1981: 914-927) on the basis of the previous work by Roberts (1977: 329-
340) and Romer (1975: 163-185). In this context, a unique redistributive tool is 
considered, namely a linear income tax with an intercept. This implies that 
redistribution is simplified to a single dimension, which in turn allows for single-
peaked preferences and the application of the median voter theorem. For the 
purposes of this section, let me recall the major implication of this model: the amount 
of redistribution is a function of the relative position of the median voter on the 
income scale: the larger the distance between the income of the median voter and the 
average (mean) income in the society, the larger the preferred amount of 
redistribution3.  In what follows, I apply this logic to a situation in which there exist 
several layers of power.  By decentralization I refer to a system in which sub-national 
political entities (regions, states, provinces or, if preferred, nations) are allowed to 
make their own choices concerning redistribution. Alternatively, under centralization 
the citizens of all regions are pooled into a common decision making process. 
 
This basic tool allows one to define three basic scenarios that help to explore 
the link between decentralization and income inequality.  Let Yc, Yg, Yn be the 
                                                          
3 Admittedly, this is an oversimplification of the actual politics of redistribution taking place in each 
of these regions or the nation as a whole. The number of actual determinants of redistribution is much 
larger, even if considerations about the insurance role of welfare state policies are left aside (Huber et 
al. 2001; Pierson (ed.) 2001; Iversen and Soskice 2001). However, such oversimplification is, at this 
point, necessary in order to identify the dimension of interest in this section. 
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average pre-tax income in areas c, g and n, where subscript n  represents  the national 
level and subscripts c and g are regions. Let Ymc, Ymg and Ymn be the median voter’s 
pre-tax income in regions c, g and at the national level, n. Finally let tc, tg, tn be the 
level of redistribution adopted in regions c, g and at the national level, n. 
 
Scenario A: (Ymc/Yc)=(Ymg/Yg); and (Ymc/Yc)=(Ymg/Yg)=(Ymn/Yn) provided that 
Yc=Yg=Yn , Ymc=Ymg=Ymn, but Yn≠Ymn4. 
 
Scenario B: (Ymc/Yc)=(Ymg/Yg); but (Ymc/Yc)=(Ymg/Yg)≠(Ymn/Yn), because 
Yc≠Yg≠Yn. 
 
Scenario C: (Ymc/Yc)≠ (Ymg/Yg), which implies (Ymc/Yc)≠(Ymg/Yg)≠(Ymn/Yn). 
 
The first scenario (A) defines the characteristics of a nation where the 
structure of inequality, i.e., the distance between the income of the median voter and 
the mean income in each demos, is identical for the two regions and the national 
level. Thus the preferred level of redistribution in regions c and g and at the national 
level (n) is the same. Under these circumstances the level of decentralization bears 
no salience for redistribution and inequality. All regions have similar patterns of 
wealth and income distributions and, subsequently, the integration of all regions 
results in a nation that resembles each of its parts. Thus it does not matter at which 
level of government the power to redistribute is allocated to. The distribution of 
income remains unaltered. This does not necessarily imply that decentralization has 
no consequences in other realms.  These may be related to issues of efficiency gains 
in relation to the provision of other types of public goods or issues of (dis)economies 
of scale. Albeit highly unrealistic, this benchmark case illustrates that 
decentralization has implications for the distribution of income if and only if it is 
introduced in places in which there is some pattern of regional inequality.  This 
brings us to scenarios B and C. 
In the case of scenario B, the structure of inequality is similar across regions, 
but, since Yc≠Yg≠Yn, it is no longer the case that the distance between the mean and 
the median voter’s income is the same at the national level as at the regional level. 
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The point to note here is that, even in the rather unlikely case that the structure of 
inequality is similar across different regions, a change from decentralization to 
centralization (and vice versa) would imply a change in the preferred level of 
redistribution. Let me illustrate the point with a numerical example. Assume a union 
of two regions. Each of the regions has three households. In the first region 
household incomes are given by 1, 3 and 6. In turn, in the second region household 
incomes are given by 4, 12 and 24. Both regions have the same median to mean ratio, 
i.e., 9/10. However, the ratio at the union level, i.e. considering the six  households 
together, is a different one, namely less than 18/25. In these circumstances, an 
institutional change from centralization to decentralization would alter the preferred 
level of redistribution without introducing inter-regional differences. This effect is 
called hereafter the “between levels”5 effect of decentralization on the distribution of 
income. The “between levels” effect points to the fact that an institutional change 
affects the income distribution because the change in the scale of the political process 
as such shifts the income of the median voter. Given the conditions specified in B, a 
shift from decentralization towards centralization would imply no equalization in the 
levels of redistribution (t) across regions.  
 
Finally, in the far more realistic scenario (C), regions differ not only in their 
average income levels, but also in their internal distribution of income and, as a 
result, have different preferences for redistribution. In contrast to B, these 
preferences diverge not only between a hypothetical central government and all the 
regions, but also among regions themselves. Thus, a shift towards decentralization 
would impose a change in the scale of redistribution that would be specific to every 
single region. Conversely, a switch towards centralization would imply not only a 
change in the scale but also in the homogenization of t across regions. Scenario C 
conveys the “homogenization/diversification” effect of decentralization on the 
distribution of income. Again, a numerical example is illustrative. Consider two 
regions with three households each. The income of these households is distributed as 
follows: 1, 3, 6 is the income of the households in the first region, while 4, 6 and 30 
represents the income of the households in the second. Note that the ratio at the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
4 If the median and the mean happened to be the same in any given territorial level, in the context of 
the median voter framework, there would be no need for redistribution. 
5 Levels refer here to central and regional as distinct realms of political authority. 
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union level is similar to the one in Scenario B, namely less than 18/25. In this case a 
change from centralization towards decentralization would lead the first region to opt 
for a level of redistribution given by 9/10. In turn, in the second region, the median to 
mean ratio is 9/20. The degree of redistribution increases in the second region in 
relation to both the first region and the union. 
 
A priori, the overall impact of these two effects on the distribution of income 
is far from obvious. It is certain that decentralization has an effect, but this effect 
need not work always in the same direction. Therefore, the distributive consequences 
of decentralization cannot be established a priori. In addition, preferences are defined 
as a function of the internal structure of inequality in a specific territorial unit and not 
as a direct reflection of its level of income/wealth. Thus, it is not necessarily the case 
that poor regions always prefer centralization to decentralization while rich regions 
always opt for decentralizing (Persson and Tabellini 1994: 765-773). A case in point 
would be the one of a poor region whose citizens rather keep a decentralized system 
in order to implement more generous redistributive policies. Furthermore, in the 
presence of unequal regions the institutional design modifies the preferences for 
redistribution: citizens that support a particular redistributive policy at the regional 
level need not automatically support the same one at the national level, and vice-
versa. Suppose Yc>Yg and  (Ymc/Yc) > (Ymg/Yg). Under these conditions tc >tg, i.e., 
the rich region is more redistributive than the poor one. If redistribution were to be 
centralized, citizens in c would support a smaller t since a majority of citizens in c 
would become net contributors and a majority of citizens in g would be net 
recipients6. All in all, this points to the idea that the specific direction of the effects 
of an institutional change depends upon the status quo in terms of the structure of 
inequality. 
 
Precisely on these grounds, it is reasonable to assume that political actors, 
when deciding about the levels of centralization/decentralization of the welfare state, 
are aware of the structure of inequality within the different territories, from which 
they derive an expectation about the level of redistribution to be generated by any 
specific institutional design. In other words, by deciding on the institutional design 
                                                          
6 For a similar argument applied to different policy issues where the logic of the process leading to a 
change in preferences is formally depicted,  see Rose-Ackerman (1981: 152-165). 
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they are also making a choice about income redistribution. There is a political 
process according to which the structure of inequality shapes the levels of 
decentralization, ultimately a political process accounting for the different 
relationships between institutional designs and levels of inequality. To put it simply, 
decentralization is endogenous to income inequality. The question at the core of our 
problem becomes, then, how the structure of inequality determines the incentives of 
actors to centralize/decentralize different welfare policies, thereby generating the 
overall level of decentralization of the welfare state. The next section of the paper 
turns to this question. 
 
2.- The Model: the Structure of Inequality and the Decentralization of 
Redistribution 
 
The development of the argument requires building a link between a number 
of aspects of the regions’ distributions of income and their incentives to choose a 
particular territorial design of redistribution. In order to identify these aspects and 
their effects, this section presents a very simple model of institutional choice in 
which the relevant actors face the problem of  
 
Max (U(c)d, U(c)c), 
 
Where U(c)d denotes the value of consumption under decentralization and  
U(c)c denotes the  value of consumption under a centralized design of redistribution. 
Intuitively, the basic problem underlying a decision about the scope of 
(de)centralization of any given welfare policy is similar to the one underlying the 
decision to integrate or separate, since decentralization implies separation for that 
particular policy realm and vice-versa. Therefore, the theoretical work developed in 
this section takes the Bolton and Roland (1997:1057-1090) and the Alesina and 
Perotti (1998: 989-1008) models to explain the politics of separation and integration 
as its point of departure. The main contribution of this paper consists in the 
incorporation to the analysis of the role of individual specific risks derived from the 
degree of specialization of the working population in each territorial unit.  
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The model starts from its more general form by considering three dimensions 
of the problem, namely the differences between regions in terms of average income, 
the differences between regions in terms of the incidence of individual specific risks 
and, thirdly, the role of the exposure to regional specific shocks. In a second step, the 
problem is simplified by assuming away the impact of external shocks. This 
facilitates a more precise treatment of the link between the different dimensions of 
the structure of inequality and the incentives underlying the institutional choice can 
be developed. Before presenting the argument in full, I turn now to discuss the 
assumptions on which it is built. 
 
2.1.- Assumptions 
 
A.1.- Neither citizens nor endowments are allowed to move between regions in 
response to the nature of different redistributive policies. This simplifies the analysis 
by freezing the strategic interactions between regions. 
 
A.2.- The decision about the institutional design of redistribution is to be made 
before the economic outcome is known, i.e., (1) before the representative individual 
of the region knows which sector he/she is going to end up in and/or (2) before it is 
known which region is the lucky one. This rather unrealistic assumption is helpful in 
that it makes unnecessary to identify specifically in which sector the median voter is. 
 
A.3.- Redistribution is performed via a linear tax with an intercept. This allows to 
assume that the level of redistribution is determined by a single issue majority vote.  
 
A.4.- A Union with two regions is considered. Regions have very simple economies. 
Regions are assumed to have three sectors: α, β and  λ.   
 
The α sector represents the share of the working population that works in a 
sector with no individual specific risks, but exposed to regional specific ones. These 
risks take the form of a shock (S) that, following Alesina and Perotti (1998: 989-
1008), is assumed to be negatively perfectly correlated between the two regions. In 
other words, for one lucky (S=1) region in the union there is necessarily an unlucky 
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(S=-1) one. Let (1+S) represent the external shock affecting people working in the α 
sector. β represents the sector of the population that derive their income from labor 
market  activities subject to individual specific risks.  Hence α(1-t)wi(1+S)  and  β(1-
t)wi  denote the after tax income of the people in the two working sectors of the 
economy. Finally, λ represents the non-working population, whose income comes 
from the share of aggregate output per capita (y) that has been taxed (yt). So let  (1-t) 
wi denote the after tax income of the people in the working sector of the population 
(β). Finally, let  (t-t2/2)y be the income of the people ending up in the  λ sector, 
where t2/2 captures, conventionally, the deadweight losses of redistribution. 
 
A.5.- Risks imply uncertainties about income. In the case of α, these uncertainties 
are a function of the probability of being subject to an external shock. In the case of 
β, the uncertainties derive from individual specific risks, associated with the degree 
of economic specialization. σz will denote the variance due to the individual specific 
risks, whereas, in turn, σs will denote the variance of the regional specific shock. The 
definition of the expected utility of each of the sectors (α, β) affected by income 
risks is modeled using a quadratic utility function of the following form (Varian 
1980:49-67). Let  z represent the income of the sector with individual specific risks. 
Then,  
 
 E(u)= E(z-z2/2),  where 
E(z2)= E(z)2 + var z 
and 
var z=σ2 w2(1-t) 2 . 
 
A.6.- Finally, in order to keep the analysis manageable, other aspects of the politics 
of the institutional design needs to be simplified.  In line with previous models 
(Bolton and Roland 1997: 1057-90), I assume that there is a union, in our case, 
centralization, only  if it is unanimously accepted by  the regions. By doing so the 
institutional specificities of the interactions between regions are frozen and the link 
between the structure of inequality and the institutional design of redistribution 
become more isolatable and tractable. Hence the usefulness of this assumption. 
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2.2.- The Structure of Inequality and the Institutional Choice7. 
 
Taken together, these assumptions imply that the utility function of any given 
territorial level must be defined as a function of two unknown variables and their 
interaction through the tax rate: (1) whether or not the external shock (S) is positive 
or negative; (2) the incidence of individual specific risks; and (3) the fact that the tax 
base and the tax rate affecting all three sectors are also a function of the external 
shock. More formally: 
 
EU(c)= α∫U(S)dF(S) + β∫∫U(S zi) dF(S)dG(zi) + λ∫U(S)dF(S)           (1) 
 
where S captures the unknown external shock and zi the incidence of 
unknown individual specific risks. The evaluation of (1) across two different 
institutional regimes encompasses two analytically different issues regarding the 
institutional choice: the impact of the structure of inequality within each region on 
the institutional choice on the one hand and the impact of external shocks (S) on the 
other. Of these two issues, this paper is mainly concerned with the first one. Thus, in 
order to simplify the analysis, I shall introduce one further assumption: regions are 
not exposed to external shocks while facing the institutional choice. In terms of our 
model, α=0. In this way8, the link between the structure of inequality within regions 
                                                          
7 Notation: the absence of a subscript implies reference to the regional level. Subscript u indicates 
reference to the union level. So for instance wi represents the pre-tax income of an individual of the 
region whereas wiu represents the pretax income of an individual of the union. Similarly wm represents 
the pretax income of the median voter of the region whereas wmu represents the pretax income of the 
union’s median voter. 
 
8 Note that this assumption does not imply to consider external shocks irrelevant for the institutional 
choice. Rather it is meant to be a more straightforward ceteris paribus condition. For a detailed 
inclusion in the model of the role of regional specific shocks and an empirical test of its implications  
see Beramendi (2003). According to the more extended version of the model, a  shock S may interact 
with the units in different ways. If it affects all the units in the same way,  it  encourages centralization 
by increasing risk sharing. If alternatively, it affects the risks structure of the units (λ, σ) differently, it 
reinforces the trade-offs by generating a situation of partial risk pooling. In fact, under  specific 
circumstances the need to overcome the different tradeoffs can be equally shared across regions, 
generating  the rationale for institutional innovation. Historically, for those fields in which this trade-
off is very tight, modern federations have overcome it by making the institutional design of 
redistribution bi-dimensional (Buchanan 1950: 583-599; Boadway 2001: 103-110; Cremer et al. 1997: 
325-335). In a hypothetical situation in which all regions face a unit specific risk (S), albeit at 
different levels, while all of them are specialized in different sectors of production, the model predicts 
that decentralization prevails. However, both regions would agree to develop a system of inter-
regional transfers that  provides some insurance against S.  Indeed Alesina et al. (2001) have identified 
this combination as the most efficient institutional rule for federations in that it respects local 
differences at the same time as providing insurance to the regions. Nevertheless in this kind of context 
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and the institutional choice can be isolated and identified more clearly.  The model is 
now concerned with just two aspects of the problem, namely the differences between 
regions in terms of average income and the region differential in terms of individual 
specific risks.  
 
The individual specific risks are assumed to be the result of different degrees 
of economic specialization. By definition specialization implies that the number of 
possible alternatives in the event of an adverse shock is smaller. As a result, both 
employers and employees in that sector/region bear higher income risks. As argued 
by a recent stream of welfare state research (Mares 2001: 184-213; Estevez, Iversen 
and Soskice 2001; Iversen and Soskice 2001: 875-895), this fact conditions heavily 
their preferences about redistribution. The higher the levels of asset specificity 
(which parallels economic specialization), the higher the support for redistribution 
and the more likely it is that employers and employees will endorse a common and 
more generous policy. And this is so because, for higher levels of specialization, the 
insurance motive is likely to dominate the standard rich versus poor conflict. 
Employers no longer associate less efficiency with more redistribution. Rather, 
redistribution becomes a form of insurance that facilitates the working of the 
economy. From here it follows that in a very specialized  sector of the economy, 
contributors and potential recipients have something to gain from a commonly 
agreed redistributive policy within any given territory.  
 
This logic is also very relevant for the analysis of preferences regarding 
different institutional designs, in that specialized regions are likely to show a rather 
different structure of incentives compared to non specialized ones9. The losses 
                                                                                                                                                                    
the efficiency gains may be undermined by a potential moral hazard problem pointed out by Persson 
and Tabellini (1996b: 623-646): localities may undertake redistributive policies that increase the 
probability of having a unit specific shock.   
 
9 Specialization also matters in that it affects factor mobility. In the presence of specialization, perfect 
factor mobility is no longer in place. A highly specialized sector of the labor force is less re-
employable anywhere else in the country. Hence, those individuals have little incentives to move since 
there is not much demand for their skills. A  prominent example here is provided by the fishermen of 
Nova Scotia (Canada). A similar logic applies to capital: specialized industries need labor with a 
particular set of qualifications that is not necessarily available all over the country. Thus they have an 
incentive to sacrifice some of their returns, in the form of taxes, to employ a better equipped labor 
force, as opposed to moving automatically to any region offering a capital tax reduction equal to or 
higher than the sum of the moving and the fixed cost left behind. Specialized capital and labor are, 
overall, less mobile, which in turn increases even further their exposure to risk (Wildasin 1995: 527-
546) and binds them to agree on a set of common redistributive policies that suits the working of an 
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attached to possible adverse circumstances are larger and so is the uncertainty about 
future income. In this context, it is possible to conceive of a theoretical link between 
the degree of specialization and the evaluation of the insurance properties of different 
territorial designs of the welfare state10.  
 
In an economy in which α=0, the expected utility function of a representative 
individual at the regional level is defined as follows: 
 
EU(c)= β∫U(zi)df(zi) + λyt - λyt2/2                                                                        (2a) 
 
Where zi  depicts the unknown incidence of individual specific risks. Equivalently, 
 
EU(c)=  β[wi(1-t)- wi2(1-t)2(1+σz2)] + λyt - λyt2/2                                               (2b) 
 
 Any given individual will choose the tax rate that maximizes her after tax 
income. Hence the relevant partial derivative becomes: 
 
∂E/∂t=  -βwi + (1-t)λy + (1-t)[ 2βwi2(1+σz2)]                                                        
 
being  the solution to the resulting first order condition as follows:  
 
 t*= 1- βwi/λy+[ 2βwi2(1+σz2)]                                                                         (3) 
 
Similarly, it is possible to define the tax rate that an individual of a union (u) 
chooses where one sector of the working population is exposed to a certain degree of 
individual specific risks while the other sector of the population consists of the 
dependent population. Note that, 
βu=(β1+β2)/(αu+βu+λu), 
which is to say that the relative weight of the economically specialized sector in the 
union is not necessarily similar to the one in the region. Nor it is, as a result, the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
economy. The expected pattern of behavioral responses by market actors to redistribution can then be 
considered a function of specialization. 
 
10 On the conception of redistributive taxation as a provider of social insurance see Varian (1980: 49-
67), Atkinson (1995) and Sinn (1995: 495-526). 
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incidence of individual specific risks for workers in βu. By analogy, the tax rate 
chosen by any member of the union will be the one that maximizes the union’s 
members after tax income, i.e.,   
 
tu*= 1- βuwiu/λuyu[ 2βuwiu2(1+σzu2)]                                                                (4) 
 
From (2) and (3) it is straightforward to see that the larger the dependent 
population, the larger the preferred tax rate. In addition, consistent with previous 
insights (Varian 1980: 49-67; Iversen and Soskice 2001: 875-895), expressions (3) 
and  (4) also show  that when the risk inherent to the people working in the specific 
sector increases, the preferred tax rate also increases,  paralleling the demand for 
insurance. And this holds for any given territorial unit under consideration. Other 
things being equal, an increase in σ leads to a reduction in (1-t) and therefore to an 
increase in t. 
 
At this point, in line with Bolton and Roland (1997:1057-1090) and Alesina 
and Perotti (1998: 989-1008), assumption A.3 helps simplify the problem very much. 
Under the conditions outlined in A.3, (1) the equilibrium tax rate is the tax rate 
chosen by the median voter in both the union and the region and, equally, (2) the 
decision to centralize/decentralize will be driven by the evaluation of the difference 
between the expected utility of the median voter under decentralization and the 
expected utility of the median voter under centralization, i.e., when the tax 
implemented is the one chosen by the union’s median voter.  
 
In order to perform such an exercise, it is necessary to substitute  the relevant 
tax rates of the two institutional regimes into the utility function of the regional 
median voter. The utility function of the regional median voter can be generally 
defined as: 
 
EUm(c)=     β[wm(1-t)- wm2(1-t)2(1+σz2)] + λyt - λyt2/2                         (5) 
 
whereas the relevant tax rates are: 
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tm = 1- βwm/λy+[ 2β w2m(1+σz2)]                                                              (6) 
and  
tmu = 1- βuwmu/λuyu[ 2βuwmu2(1+σzu2)]                                                       (7) 
 
By substituting (5) and (6) into (4), the utilities of the regional median voter 
under the two regimes are obtained. Thereafter, we are in a position to evaluate the 
differences between the two. Once these calculations are made, the following 
expression is obtained: 
 
EUm(c)d -EUm(c)c=                                                                                         ( 8) 
 
1/2(y-yu) +  
βwm[2βwm -λy-a]/2[λy+a] -   βwmu[2βwm -λy-a]/2[λuyu+au] 
 
where a= [ 2β w2m(1+σz2)]  and au=[2βwmu2(1+σzu2)]  are, respectively, the terms 
capturing the individual specific risks at the regional and the union level. Given that 
(8) is not self-evident, I shall discuss the implications of the model using two 
numerical examples. Table 1 presents two simulations based on expression (8). In 
both cases the region is poorer than the union. In the first simulation this is the only 
feature that distinguishes the region from the union. The second simulation is 
identical to the first one, except in that it introduces a second dimension of difference 
between the region and the union; namely, it allows for differences in terms of the 
incidence of individual specific risks. 
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Table 1. - Implications of Model I: Numerical examples. 
Scenario I: The impact of differences in terms of average income.  
Conditions EUm(c)d -EUm(c)c 
 
βwm =βwmu=4  
y=6 ; yu=7 
λu=λ=0.5 
σz2  = σzu2 =1; au=a=64 
 
 
 
-0.6 
 
Scenario II: Adding differences in terms of incidence of individual specific risks. 
Conditions EUm(c)d -EUm(c)c 
 
βwm =βwmu=4  
y=6 ; yu=7 
λu=λ=0.5 
σz2  =2  a= 160; σzu2 =1 au=64 
 
 
+0.1 
 
 
Source: calculations by the author based on expression (8)            
 
 
Scenario I illustrates very well the importance of the income differences 
between the regions in the politics of institutional choice. In the absence of any other 
difference poorer regions have an incentive to opt for centralization since, under such 
a design, they are able to capture part of the income of their wealthier partners. 
These, on the other hand, would have no incentive to centralize at all. Similarly 
expression (8) indicates how differences across regions in terms of their share of the 
dependent population shape the incentives for decentralization.  For those regions 
where the incidence is low, decentralization is the obvious choice. Yet this is only 
part of the story.  
 
The comparison between scenarios I and II shows that when other dimensions 
of inequality are taken into account, poor regions face a trade-off between the inter-
regional income transfers implicit to centralization and their capacity to maintain 
their preferred policy choice in order to cope with their own specific labor market 
risks. Scenario II exemplifies how, in the presence of sufficiently large differences in 
terms of the incidence of individual specific risks, the payoffs of centralization are 
overcome by the costs of having the union’s preferred level of redistribution 
imposed. A specialized poor region may choose to stay on its own in order to protect 
its capacity to chose how much redistribution is to be provided. This is exemplified 
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by the fact that the differential between utilities goes from -0.6 (centralization as the 
preferred outcome) to 0.1 (decentralization the preferred outcome) even in the 
presence of identical income differences.  
 
 An alternative way of thinking about the incidence of individual specific risks 
is the following. Suppose that yu= y ;   wm = wmu,  λu = λ but σz2  ≠ σzu2, and recall 
that expression  (6) maximizes (2). Under these conditions designs other than 
decentralization can at best make the regional median voter indifferent between the 
two. The implications for the relation between the tax preferred in each of these cases 
and the utilities expected by the regional median voter are represented in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From expressions (6) and (7) it is easy to see that as σz2 >< σzu2  , t m ><  tmu , 
which, as depicted in Figure 1, implies a decrease in the expected utilities of the 
regional median voter. Hence, unless σz = σzu no alternative institutional design is 
considered, which is to say that any institutional option that implies a change in any 
of the parameters defining the current structure of inequality will be rejected by the 
regional median voter. In relation to the issue of concern in this section, the 
implications are clear.  Differences across regions in the level of economic 
Figure 1: Individual Risks differential across units and institutional choice. 
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specialization generate incentives for decentralizing because they imply varying 
degrees of exposure to income risks by individuals in different regions, which in 
turn, generates differences in the degree of public insurance demanded by citizens 
across regions. In other words, economic specialization enhances decentralization in 
that it widens the differences across regions regarding the preferences for 
redistribution. Indeed, specialization may shape the politics of redistribution across 
territorial units even up to the point of overcoming the pro-centralization incentives 
of lower income regions, as illustrated above. 
 
  The thrust of the model presented above is that the choice of the level of 
decentralization of redistribution is endogenous to the structure of inequality because 
of the income differential on the one hand and the patterns of risk sharing between 
regions on the other. Consider two regions A and B deciding whether or not to 
centralize a particular redistributive policy. A and B share risks fully if they have a 
similar degree of exposure to S (in this case 0) and their distributions of income are 
structured in a similar way. Under these circumstances centralization is the obvious 
institutional choice. The opposite happens when the degree of exposure to external 
shocks varies and inequality is structured differently across regions.  Decentralization 
is the obvious outcome since at least one of the regions has no incentive to centralize 
redistribution11.  
 
However, risk sharing is seldom clearly defined, though. A large share of 
institutional choices demand from regions to balance how much autonomy they are 
willing to exchange from insurance and vice-versa. Provided that regions differ in 
income, poor regions must trade-off the cost of having a policy different from the 
one they would have chosen for the gains from being able to obtain some of the 
richer regions’ wealth. The dilemma of wealthier regions is, in principle, easier since 
they have no incentive to centralize. Moreover, even in the hypothetical case that 
                                                          
11 The institutional outcome in this context is also affected by the number of regions and their specific 
characteristics as well as by the procedure to adopt the collective choice (Persson and Tabellini 2000: 
159-201). Note also that the idea that decentralization of redistribution is more likely to take place 
when social risks are not shared between regions  is perfectly consistent with more normative 
considerations concerning  the benefits of decentralization as a tool for dealing with informational 
problems associated with the functioning of the policy (see, among others, Oates 1999: 1120-1149). 
However, even so, the model shows that the underlying causal logic is a different one.  Informational 
advantages may well help explain why a particular design remains over time, but tracing its origins to 
its alleged functional advantages subverts the sequence of causation. 
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regions do not differ largely in income a typical situation may involve differences in 
terms of individual specific risks (σ), but some degree of similarity in terms of the 
share of the dependent population (λ). To conclude, for any given union, the choice 
of a particular territorial design of redistribution depends upon the internal 
composition of the union in terms of regional incomes and risk structures.  The next 
section turns to the empirical analysis of the relation between decentralization and 
income inequality in light of the implications of the model. 
 
3.- Decentralization and Income Inequality: Empirical Analysis 
 
3.1.- Derivation of Hypotheses 
 At the core of the argument developed in the previous section is the idea that,  
because actors have an expectation about the effects of any given institutional 
change, the design and evolution of institutions (in this case, the decentralization of 
redistribution) is endogenous to the structure of inequality. The causal story would 
not be, as conventionally assumed in the literature (see below), one about exogenous 
effects of intrinsically inegalitarian institutions. Rather, it is one in which, given a 
particular structure of inequality, a political process determines the selection of 
institutions according to (i) their expected distributive effects and (ii) the dominating 
preferences among the relevant actors. Hence if decentralization is endogenous to 
inequality it is precisely because it is expected to interact with those dimensions that 
make regions diverge in their preferences about redistribution. Such an interaction, in 
turn, becomes a function of the territorial distribution of specialized economic 
sectors, the regional shares of dependent population and the extent to which there are 
region-specific shocks. As it stands, two major implications can be derived from this 
argument for the empirical analysis of the impact of decentralization on income 
inequality. 
a) The dominant approach in the studies about the impact of decentralization 
on redistribution and inequality is to consider decentralization as exogenous to the 
dependent variable12. If, according to the argument of this paper, it is thought 
                                                          
12 Previous contributions to the literature, in assuming that causality worked only from 
decentralization towards redistribution and inequality, have both excluded inequality as a determinant 
of decentralization (Garrett and Rodden 2003; Panizza 1999: 97-139) and, more importantly,  ignored 
the problem of endogeneity when analyzing the impact of decentralization on redistribution and 
inequality (Huber et al. 1993: 711-750;  Huber and Stephens 2001). 
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otherwise, it seems reasonable to believe that the effect identified by previous 
approaches is due, in some proportion, to reverse causality. In fact, if the theory is 
correct, the magnitude of the upward bias due to reverse causality should be large 
enough to alter the estimates assessing the impact of decentralization on inequality. 
This claim is itself a testable proposition in that if decentralization is indeed 
endogenous to inequality, it should be found that, once the relation is specified to 
take this possibility into account,  the impact of decentralization on inequality is 
substantially reduced or even ceases to be significant. From now on I shall refer to 
this claim as the "Endogeneity Hypothesis" (EH). 
 
b) The very notion of two-way causality derives from the central claim of the 
model, namely that the institutional choice depends on the differences across regions 
in terms of average incomes and the incidence of individual specific risks. More 
specifically, it follows from the model that the greater the distance between regions 
in terms of income and labor market structures, the higher the levels of 
decentralization of redistribution, even after the relevant controls for endogeneity 
have been introduced. From now on, I shall refer to this claim as the “Reproduction 
Hypothesis” (RH), implying that in this second line of causation inequality 
reproduces itself by facilitating the choice of particular sets of institutions. 
 
3.2.- Methodological Approach 
 These two hypotheses are tested against a data set of 15 OECD countries 
during the period 1980-1997. The hypotheses are tested separately because inequality 
is not measured in the same way for each of them. In EH inequality refers to the 
overall distribution of income and hence it is operationalized using the Gini 
coefficient.  In the case if RH the structure of inequality refers to the income 
differential between regions in terms of average income. This is operationalized 
using the Between Groups share of the Theil Index (see below). Herein lies the 
impossibility of testing both hypotheses using one single system of equations. The 
methodological approach is however similar in both cases. In this section I present  
its main features. Thereafter, I discuss the variables used in the testing of both the EH 
and the RH. 
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The testing of both the EH and the RH requires tackling the issue of 
endogeneity. In addition, the testing of the EH requires  contrasting one-way against 
two way specifications. Thus, in this case, I first present several specifications in 
which a more conventional, one-way, approach is followed. In a second step, I re-
estimate the models implementing several techniques designed to take into account 
the issue of endogeneity between the left and some of the right hand side variables. 
For the sake of consistency, a similar strategy is followed in the case of RH. In what 
follows, I introduce the more conventional approaches, discuss in detail the problem 
of endogeneity and briefly present the features of the strategy adopted to overcome 
it. 
 By conventional approaches I refer to standard fixed and random effects 
estimations of the relations of interest (Greene 2000). A random effects model has 
the following form: 
Yit= α + β1Xit + β2...n γit+  εit 
where  α represents the constant , Xit represents the independent variable of interest, 
in this case different indicators of the structure of inequality,  γit depicts the 
controlvariables, and ε it denotes the error term. 
 
Alternatively, the fixed effect estimation as implemented here can be 
presented as follows: 
Yit= ci + ti +β1Xit + β2...n γit+  εt 
where ci  depicts a dummy variable for the cross-sectional units, and ti represents, 
when included, time periods dummies. 
 
Comparative political economists disagree about the benefits of either 
strategy  and are caught up in an ongoing lack of robustness dilemma. Random and 
fixed effects differ in their assumptions about the share of the variance to be 
exploited in order to identify the models. While the former gets all the benefits from 
pooling by considering the within- and the between- unit components of the variance 
at once, the latter freezes the between-unit component by introducing a unit dummy 
per cross-sectional unit. In so doing, it is concerned only with the within-unit share 
of the variance, in our case, the over-time behavior of the observations. Generally, 
fixed effects pose a harder test for any given hypothesis. They impose strong 
restrictions that take away the unit specific variation and, therefore, require controls 
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that vary over time (otherwise there is no variance left to be accounted for). On the 
contrary, random effects allow for controls that do not vary over time. Table 2 
includes the coefficients for the Random and the Fixed effects models in order to 
assess the extent to which the results are sensitive to different assumptions. In this 
fashion, Table 2 also includes two Tobit specifications, one with country dummies, 
the other without them. The inclusion of these two models addresses a potential 
problem of mispecification due to the fact that the dependent variable ranges 
between 0 and 1. In principle, Tobit models are a special case of lower truncation in 
which the censor limit is set to 0. More generally, the likelihood function can be 
rewritten to take into account an upper limit, in this case 113 (Greene 2000: ch.20).    
 
In a second step (Table 3), the models are re-specified to cope with the 
problem of endogeneity. There is a problem of endogeneity when "the values of our 
explanatory variable are sometime the consequence, rather than the cause, of our 
dependent variable" (King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 185; Manski 1995: 127-129). 
More technically, endogeneity refers to the fact that "an independent variable is 
potentially a choice variable, correlated with unobservables in the error term 
(Millimet 2001:2)14. There are several strategies to correct for this problem.  
 
 The first available  solution to correct this problem is the one  proposed by 
Baltagi (1995, 2002: 130-155), namely a two-stage least squares approach with 
instrumental variables. In this context the key issue in order to overcome endogeneity 
and properly identify the relations of interest is to find adequate instruments, i.e., "a 
variable that is correlated with the endogenous variable, uncorrelated with the error 
term and does not affect the outcome of interest conditional on the included 
regressors" (Millimet 2001:4). However, this solution is no panacea, for the 
                                                          
13 In real terms, however, taking the Gini coefficient as the dependent variable, the lower limit never 
equals 0 (a perfectly egalitarian society) nor does the upper one equals 1 ( a perfectly inegalitarian 
society). A more realistic specification for the OECD would be to set the truncation points at 0.20 and 
0.60.The existence of an upper and a lower limit could also suggest a third alternative approach other 
than Tobit. Let G  represent the Gini Coefficient. By taking the log {G/1-G}, the dependent variable 
would range between minus infinity and plus infinity, facilitating the implementation of the standard 
assumptions of the regression model. 
14 In the real world this distinction is often subtle and complicated. Indeed the specialized literature 
seems to have taken a different path by establishing the conditions under which an independent 
variable x can be considered strictly exogenous in relation to y. These are mainly two: weak 
exogeneity and absence of Granger causality. For a discussion on these issues see Greene (2000: 656-
657). 
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identification of simultaneous equation models is not straightforward (Wlezien 
2002:14). In this sense, the two stage least squares approach imposes the restriction 
that the error terms of the n-equations included in the system are uncorrelated. Such 
an assumption is not necessarily reasonable15. Hence there is room to worry about 
the possibility of the findings obtained from the implementation of Baltagi’s 
approach to being an artifact of a (potentially) implausible assumption. In order to 
rule out this possibility, an alternative way of estimating simultaneous equation 
models has been implemented, namely the GLS16 Zellner’s Seemingly Unrelated 
Approach, designed specifically, in the context of simultaneous equations models, to 
control for contemporaneous cross-equations error correlations.  
 
In the case of the RH a similar strategy is followed to cope with the problem 
of endogeneity. The dependent variable, welfare decentralization, ranges  once again 
between 0 and 1. In fact, for a significant number of countries, namely the most 
centralized ones, the value of the decentralization of redistribution is expected to be 
0. Thus a Tobit estimation is included. There is, however, one difference in  the 
specifications selected: as ethnic fractionalization does not vary over time, it is not 
possible to include fixed effects.  
 
3.3.- Variables of Interest, Control Variables and Selection of Instruments17 
 
3.3.1.- Endogeneity Hypothesis 
 
 The testing of the EH requires assessing the role of decentralization (the 
variable of interest) within a more general analysis of the determinants of income 
inequality. Thus an indicator of overall income dispersion (the Gini coefficient for 
disposable income) is taken as dependent variable. In addition, the specification 
includes controls for the following factors: (a) political and institutional factors that 
                                                          
15 As Eriksson has argued (1987:863-881), the higher the cross-equation error correlation, the less 
likely to find a proper instrument to disentangle the two-way causality. Hence the importance of 
making the right assumptions about the structure of the error term and implementing the appropriate 
specification. 
16 Following Greene (2000: 674-688), in presence of large cross-equation error correlations, GLS is a 
more efficient approach than OLS. Consequently, the larger the correlation, the larger the efficiency 
gains of using Zellner’s approach as opposed to other approaches to simultaneous equations models. 
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affect redistribution other than decentralization; (b) the variables conditioning the 
distribution of disposable income that relate to demographic processes, general 
economic conditions and the structure and organization of the labor market (which 
are known to be a major determinant of wage inequality: Rueda and Pontusson 2000: 
350-383; Wallerstein 1999: 649-680); and (c) the  effects of previous redistributive 
policies on pre-tax income inequality (Beramendi 2001).  
  
 The inclusion as explanatory variables of the incumbent’s ideology and the 
levels of union density, together with decentralization, satisfy the controls required in 
(a). The specialized literature  has consistently proved these two variables as major 
determinants of redistribution. Union density  (taken as a proxy for labor power) and 
the incumbent’s ideology  capture two different dimensions of the standard "power 
resources approach" to the development of the welfare state18.   
 
In turn, the introduction as control of an indicator of market income 
inequality provides a straightforward solution for (b) and (c). Inequalities of 
disposable income are a function of market income inequalities and the direct effect 
of redistributive policies. What is to be assessed in the different  specifications is the 
impact of one variable that  affects redistribution and, therefore, the distribution of 
disposable income. This goal  makes the properties of an indicator of market income 
inequality a very useful tool. It aggregates the impact of economic, demographic and 
labor market related variables. More importantly, it also includes the feedback effects 
of previous redistributive policies on people’s labor market behavior and, 
subsequently, on the distribution of wages and additional sources other than earnings 
and welfare state transfers. 
  
 Finally, as to the instruments chosen in the two-way specifications, 
decentralization is instrumentalized by ethnic fractionalization. This is the only 
variable in our dataset that bears no direct relationship with the distribution of 
income while being correlated with the levels of decentralization.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
17 The definition, construction and sources of all the variables mentioned in this section are provided 
in Appendix I. 
18 See for all Huber and Stephens (2001). 
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3.3.2.- Reproduction Hypothesis  
  
The dependent variable in this case is the degree of decentralization of 
redistribution, measured as the regional share of total social expenditures as reported 
by the IMF Government Financial Statistics (see Appendix I).  As discussed above, 
the regional differences in terms of the structure of inequality are captured in two 
different ways. The first one is the coefficient of variation  of regional 
unemployment rates in OECD countries between 1980 and 199719. This indicator 
taps horizontal differences in terms of labor market structures. Since unemployment 
is normally  associated with higher pre-tax and transfers income inequality, this 
indicator can also be taken as a measuring regional differences in the share of 
inequality due to regionally specific labor market conditions.  
 
The second, and by far most accurate, indicator of the territorial structure of 
inequality consists of isolating the between groups share of total inequality by way of 
an income decomposition analysis  in which the subnational units are the partition 
criteria. In this particular case, the chosen indicator is the between-group share of the 
Theil Index. For a limited number of measurements of inequality, it is the case that  
(Cowell 2000:87-150): 
 
I(x, y)= I(x*, y*) + [wx(I(x)) + wy[(Iy)]  
  
To put it differently, they are additively decomposable. The first component 
of this identity isolates the between group variance by holding the relevant groups in 
their mean, while the second component is simply a weighted sum of the variance 
within the two groups. What we use as a variable measuring the expression 
"territorial structure of inequality" is the first component of the equation above, i.e., 
the share of total income inequality associated to regional income differences. At this 
point, it is worth noting  that this indicator combines information captured by the 
previous one in that the share of regional income variation incorporates the impact on 
                                                          
19 Details about the sources and steps undertaken in the construction of both variables are given in the 
data appendix. 
  26
the income distribution of the horizontal differences in terms of unemployment 
rates20. Thus I do not include them together in the same specification. 
 
 Let me turn now to discuss the control variables. These include the degree of 
trade openness and the level of ethnic fractionalization in the society. In addition, 
contrary to previous specifications, I have decided not to include an indicator of 
aggregate national income as a control. 
 
 The absence of an aggregate indicator of national income is justified by the 
fact that the sample of interest is restricted to OECD economies, which, as a group, 
presents relatively low levels of internal variation as opposed to a sample that 
includes a larger number of non-OECD countries. Previous contributions on the 
determinants of decentralization (Panizza 1999: 97-139) have used this type of 
sample, and it was necessary for them to include national income as a control21. 
 
 Trade openness is conventionally measured as the sum of imports and exports 
as a percentage of GDP. This variable lacks a theoretical consensus in what regards 
its expected consequences. Some scholars (Garrett and Rodden: 2003) have argued 
that a higher degree of openness should be associated with higher levels of fiscal 
centralization because of the higher levels of exposure to international competition. 
To put it in terms of our model, higher degrees of openness would imply that, given 
that exposure to international competition and its associated risks affect all regions, 
the scope of risk sharing between them increases and, therefore, so do the incentives 
to adopt a more centralized fiscal regime. In other words, with openness, S would 
increase for every region. However, this is only true on the assumption that a 
                                                          
20           |     disp indecd~p  regdisp  ethfrac 
-------------+------------------------------------ 
        disp |   1.0000 
   indecdisp |   0.6224   1.0000 
     regdisp |   0.1466   0.5968   1.0000 
     ethfrac |   0.3074   0.3382  -0.0401   1.0000, where disp is the GINi 
coefficient, Indecdisp is the between-group share of the Theil index, regdisp is the coefficient of 
variation in regional unemployment rates and Ethfrac is the index of ethnic fractionalization. 
21 Table 3 includes one further specification adding GDP to the set of controls. As it can be seen, the 
indicator of aggregate national income adds nothing to the explanation of the levels of decentralization 
of redistribution in the OECD. These results support the decision to exclude this variable as a control. 
They are also consistent with the argument by Wallis and Oates (1988:5-28) for whom the sample of 
countries used is crucial for the results. If the sample is reduced to developed nations, the relation 
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common exposure to international competition affects all regions equally. If, on the 
contrary, openness generates differential effects across regions with different 
economic structures and risk profiles, the scope of risk sharing between regions as 
defined in the model would decrease. Put differently, openness could also imply 
bigger differences across regions in terms of their respective λ or σ.  In such a 
scenario, the expected relation between openness and decentralization would be 
positive. Since there are no major theoretical reasons to believe a priori that either of 
the processes dominates the other, it is not easy to derive a clear expectation about 
the direction of the relation. Under these circumstances the whole issue becomes an 
empirical question.  
 
 Finally, the inclusion of a control for ethnic fractionalization follows from the 
well established link between the existence of multiple cultural, linguistic and/or 
religious identities and the use of decentralized political arrangements to 
accommodate them (Linz 1997;  Stepan 1997; Amoretti and Bermeo: 2003). Put 
briefly, decentralized/federal polities are more likely to emerge in ethnically, 
linguistically and/or culturally fragmented social contexts. The expected direction of 
the relation is clear. Notwithstanding the inherent limitations of any measurement of 
fractionalization, the higher its values the higher the theoretical levels of 
decentralization. 
 
As to the instruments of the two-way specifications of the RH,  two variables 
have been chosen: an indicator of the ideology of the incumbent, shown by previous 
contributions to be a determinant of the degree of redistribution and, thus,  of the 
levels of income inequality (Iversen 2001: 45-88; Huber and Stephens: 2001); and an 
indicator of union density, equally identified by previous contributions as a 
determinant of both the levels of redistribution and wage inequality (Huber and 
Stephens: 2001; Wallerstein 1999: 649-680; Rueda and Pontusson 2000:350-383). 
There are no evident theoretical reasons to expect either of them to directly affect the 
territorial design of redistribution.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
between national income and fiscal decentralization tends to disappear. If otherwise, as shown by 
Panizza (1999: 97-139), the relation is  positive and statistically significant. 
  28
 
3.4.- Results and Implications 
 
3.4.1.- The endogeneity hypothesis. 
 
Tables 2 and 3 display the results regarding the EH. The inclusion of different 
models in each table allows us  to check to what extent the results obtained are 
sensitive to the assumptions underpinning the different  specifications  adopted. In 
the case of the regressions in which the impact of decentralization on inequality is 
assumed to be exogenous (Table 2), the specifications included fixed and random 
effects as well as Tobit models, added to take care of the issue that the dependent 
variable is censored at 0 (lower limit) and 1 (upper limit). Alternatively, in those 
specifications where the potential problem of endogeneity is taken care of (Table 3), 
the models do not include fixed effects because, for some of them, the 
decentralization of redistribution is instrumented by ethnic fractionalization, a 
variable that does not vary over time.  
 
The control variables behave in the way that is expected, with the exception 
of the variable measuring the incumbent’s ideology. Obviously, market income 
inequality is a strong and consistent positive predictor of disposable income 
inequality. In addition, the levels of union density are, ceteris paribus, negatively 
correlated with the levels of disposable income inequality. On the contrary, the 
estimates of the variable of the incumbent’s ideology are not robust, being sensitive 
to different specifications. Nothing can be safely concluded about this variable 
except for the claim that the link between the incumbent’s ideology and the final 
outcome in terms of the distribution of income is hard to tap in the context of a 
regression analysis. 
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Table 2.- The Impact of Decentralization on Inequality I 
 MODELS ASSUMING AN EXOGENOUS EFFECT 
 Model A Model B  Model C  Model D 
Welfare 
Decentralization 
 
0.1652*** 
(0.006) 
 
0.1913*** 
(0.0113) 
 
0.129*** 
(0.010) 
 
0.191** 
(0.10) 
Union  
Density 
 
-0.0009*** 
(0.00004) 
 
-0.0007611*** 
(0.000290) 
 
-0.00094*** 
(0.000038) 
 
-0.00076*** 
(0.00028) 
Incumbent’s  
Ideology 
 
-0.00005* 
(0.00002) 
 
-0.0000246 
(0.0000191) 
 
-0.000008 
(0.0000186) 
 
 
-0.000024 
(0.000023) 
Market Income 
Inequality  
 
0.7534*** 
(0.0351) 
 
0.441*** 
(0.042) 
 
0.722*** 
(0.0103) 
 
0.441*** 
(0.047) 
R-Squared/Log 
Likelihood 
 
0.796 
 
0.964 
 
457.779 
 
509.864 
Standard Errors in Parenthesis. Model A: Random Effects. Model B: Fixed Effects. Panel Corrected 
Standard Errors. Model C: Tobit estimation excluding country dummies. Model D:Tobit estimation 
including country dummies.  
 
 
Table 3.- The Impact of Decentralization on Inequality II 
 MODELS CONTROLLING FOR 
ENDOGENEITY 
 Model A Model C 
Welfare 
Decentralization 
 
0.08177  
(0.0664) 
 
0.0298* 
(0.0178) 
Union  
Density 
 
-0.00127 (0.00028)*** 
 
-0.00090*** 
(0.00008) 
Incumbent’s  
Ideology 
 
-0.000027  
(0.000026) 
 
-0.000056 
(0.00004) 
Market Income 
Inequality  
 
0.3835 *** 
(0.0612) 
 
0.7415***  
(0.052) 
 
R-Squared 
 
0.6463 
 
0.795 
Standard Errors in Parenthesis. Model A: Two-Stages least Square Instrumental Variable Estimation. 
Decentralization is instrumented by ethnic fractionalization. Model B: Path Analysis in Structural 
form.  Model B: Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) estimation.  
 
 
This is the case mainly because governments’ policy choices potentially affecting the 
distribution of income are multidimensional (several effects may be working in 
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opposite directions) and complex enough to escape a single scale (for instance, 
conservative central European governments put a lot more effort into transfers than 
into services, which in pure income terms may make them appear fairly 
redistributive).  
 
 The test of the EH was set as a comparison of the role of the variable 
measuring the decentralization of redistribution under two types of econometric 
specifications, namely a group of models that assume the impact of decentralization 
to be exogenous and a second group in which the relation is specified controlling the 
bidirectional nature of the relation between decentralization and inequality. EH is 
supported by the results. After controlling for endogeneity, only the estimates 
obtained in the seemingly unrelated regression remain significant at the 90% 
confidence level. Moreover, they become substantially smaller than the ones 
produced by any of the models reported in Table 2.  
 
The confirmation of the endogeneity hypothesis makes clear that a large share 
of the inegalitarian effect conventionally attributed to decentralization is due to a 
problem of reverse causality in the specifications. Yet new questions arise.  
According to some of the models in Table 3, it could be argued that the relation 
between decentralization and inequality is not a bidirectional relation whose different 
sequences are analyzable in their own right, but rather a one way relation that, in 
order to be understood, must be turned upside down. Former contributions would 
have gotten the direction wrong, but the relation would still be mono-directional. 
Such an interpretation would go beyond the results reported in Tables 2 and 3. Let 
me briefly address why. 
 
 In the event of a change towards decentralization, a number of different 
political processes are activated in each of the units as well as in the union as a 
whole. Some regions, as argued above, may decide to increase redistribution while 
some others may choose otherwise. These choices are facilitated by decentralization 
itself and they channel its distributive effects. The problem is that these decisions 
may work in different ways; and depending upon how they get combined they may 
or may not be reflected by a regression coefficient. If all the units in one country 
follow a similar pattern  (say reduction of redistribution, increase in inequality), it is 
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likely that in this country the association between decentralization and inequality will 
gain in strength. As long as a similar process takes place in a large enough number of 
countries, a significant regression coefficient will emerge even after the appropriate 
controls and specifications are adopted. If, on the contrary, decentralization makes 
units follow different strategies, the distributive effects of the unit’s choices may 
cancel each other out. If this pattern is frequent enough, the coefficient in the 
regression is likely to be insignificant. But this by no means implies that 
decentralization has no distributive consequences. It simply suggests that regression 
analysis may not be the optimal tool to capture them. 
 
3.4.2.- The Reproduction Hypothesis 
 
 Table 4 reports the findings concerning the RH. Trade openness shows 
positive and significant effects, generally very small, in all fixed and random effects 
estimations, except for the one in which the structure of inequality is measured as the 
between groups share of the Theil index. This suggests that among the two possible 
effects inherent to higher levels of openness discussed in the previous section, the 
one enhancing economic specialization dominates the one leading to a converging 
increase in region specific risks (S). However, given the nature of the data, the fact 
that the variable is not consistently significant across all specifications and the fact 
that previous contributions have come to different conclusions (Garrett and Rodden: 
2003), any conclusion to be derived  from this variable should be treated with a great 
deal of cautiousness22. 
                                                          
22 The process of European Integration and its interaction with the way of measuring "trade-openness" 
may shed some light on why the results of this chapter differ from the ones in previous contributions. 
The EU has undoubtedly raised openness but, at the same time, it may have also reduced risks for its 
constituent units. Given the large number of OECD countries that actually belong to the EU,  such 
process may account for the fact that, concerning the direction of the effect, trade openness emerges as 
a factor enhancing the decentralization of social expenditures. By insuring against region-specific 
risks, the EU would be reducing the potential costs in which the Member States would incur in case 
they decided to decentralize  redistribution.  
 1 
Table 4.- Testing the Reproduction Hypothesis (Standard Errors in Parentheses). 
 
WELFARE DECENTRALIZATION (1980-1997) 
 Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E Model  F Model G 
 
Unemployment 
Regional Disparities 
 
0,1339** 
(0,056) 
 
0.0844 
(0.064) 
 
-------- 
 
--------- 
 
------ 
 
 
----- 
 
----- 
 
Between-Group Share of 
the Theil Index 
 
----------- 
 
0,0231*** 
(0,0047) 
 
0.029*** 
(0.010) 
 
0.0187*** 
(0.0040) 
 
0.0990*** 
(0.0027) 
 
0.042*** 
 
0.035*** 
 
Ethnic Fractionalization 
 
0.229*** 
(0.025) 
 
0.232*** 
(0,028) 
 
0.1731** 
(0.095) 
 
 
0.227*** 
(0.028) 
 
0.099*** 
(0.028) 
 
0.0719** 
 
0.192*** 
 
Openness  
 
 
0.00069** 
(0.00024) 
 
0,00059** 
(0.00021) 
 
0.0028 
(0.0030) 
 
0.011*** 
(0.0033) 
 
0.00066 
(0.00086) 
 
0.0012 
 
0.003** 
 
GDP 
 
 
------- 
 
----------- 
 
-------- 
 
-------- 
 
 
----------- 
 
-2.88e-08 
 
-9.33e-09 
 
R-Squared/Log-
likelihood  (N) 
 
 
0.4213 
(121) 
 
0.5229 
(121) 
 
0.4619121) 
 
0.5351 
(121) 
 
2011.4 
(121) 
 
0.527 
(121) 
 
0.552 
(121) 
Model A.-. Models A and B: Simultaneous equations models. Seemingly Unrelated Regressions Model C.- Two Steps GLS instrumental variable estimation. Random 
Effects. The Instruments for inequality are Union Density and Government Ideology . Model D.- Simultaneous equations models. Seemingly Unrelated Regressions. Model 
E.- Tobit Random Effects. Model F.- Two-Stage least squares instrumental variables estimation. Model G.- Simultaneous Equations Models. Seemingly Unrelated 
Regressions. 
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The effect of ethnic fractionalization is more consistent across the models, 
working in the expected direction and consistently with the previous literature 
(Panizza 1999: 97-139).Let me turn now to discuss the variables of interest. 
 
Of the two variables of interest, the coefficient of variation of regional 
unemployment rates shows significant effects on the degree of decentralization of 
redistribution, albeit only on its own (Models A and B, Table 4)23. In turn, the impact 
of the between groups share of the Theil Index supports the predictions of the model, 
showing a positive relation with the degree of decentralization of redistribution that 
remains significant across specifications. As in the case of EH, RH receives support 
from the data analysis. The structure of inequality shapes the degree of 
decentralization.  The question remains though as to what the real magnitude of these 
effects is. In order to answer this question, the predicted values of Model B in Table 
4 are analyzed. 
 
Graph 1 represents the impact of the between-group share of the Theil Index 
as it goes from its minimum to its maximum value, when ethnic fractionalization 
itself is at its minimum, its mean and its maximum and trade openness is kept at its 
mean. The y axis depicts the regional share of social expenditures whilst the x axis 
represents the values of the independent variable of interests at its minimum, its 
mean and its maximum.  Recall, for the purposes of interpretation, that the share of 
regional social expenditures goes from 0 to 1.  
                                                          
23 Once it is included together with the between groups share of the Theil Index, its effect vanishes. 
This points to the fact, discussed above, that both variables overlap. Because the between groups share 
of the Theil Index also reflects differences due to the incidence of unemployment, the two dimensions 
of the model (income and risks) are not perfectly isolatable given the data available. 
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It is clear from Graph 1 that the level of ethnic fractionalization has a huge 
impact in predicting the levels of decentralization, as represented by the gap between 
the "-mean" and "-max" series.   For any given value of the independent variables of 
interest, a change from the mean to the maximum value of ethnic fractionalization 
implies an increase in the regional share of social expenditures that ranges between 9 
and 16 percent points. As far as the between groups share of the Theil Index is 
concerned, a change from its minimum to its maximum value implies that the 
regional share of social expenditures increases by 19, 22 and 24 percentage points 
provided that ethnic fractionalization is, respectively, at its minimum, mean and 
maximum value. Ceteris paribus, larger regional income disparities imply more 
decentralization of redistribution. 
 
Graphs 2 and 3 exploit the time dimension of the data. An even more intuitive 
picture of the impact of the structure of inequality on the design of redistribution 
emerges from depicting by how much the regional share of social expenditures in 
any given country X changes over time if its structure of inequality happened to 
follow the pattern existing in any other nation. Graphs 2 to 4 perform this exercise 
for a number of countries included in the sample, namely the UK (Graph 2), Belgium 
Graph 1: The Impact of Inequality on Decentralization
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(Graph 3) and Canada (Graph 4). In each of them the actual regional share of social 
expenditures is compared to a simulated share.  The simulated shares are depicted for 
each Graph under the heading "as cname", where cname  represents the country 
whose regional income disparities (Theil index) are taken to simulate, given the 
parameters of the model and leaving all the other variables in their actual value over 
time, the alternative predictions. The difference between the actual share of the 
country and the simulated ones taps the magnitude of the impact of the between-
group share of the Theil Index on the regional share of social expenditures over time. 
 
 
Graph 2: UK
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G raph 3: BELGIUM
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          The resulting picture is of great interest in that the between groups share of the 
Theil Index emerges as the major determinant of the regional share of social 
expenditures. For instance,  if the levels of regional disparities in the UK resembled 
the Spanish ones (Graph 2), its regional share of social expenditures would go from 
11% (in this case, the predicted level with all the UK variables in the model) to 25% 
over a period of 15 years. An even bigger increase, from 11 to 30%, would take place 
in the event of Belgium having the Canadian structure of inequality (Graph 3). 
Finally, if Canada resembled Germany its share would have dropped from 30% to 
13-10% during the 1980s, but only from 32 to 20% during the 1990s due to the 
change in trend imposed by the Reunification (Graph 4). In sum, these graphs show 
the extent to which the regional differences in terms of average income are the 
driving force of the decentralization of redistribution, supporting the predictions of 
the model. 
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4.- Conclusion 
 
 Decentralization of political authority has become increasingly common over 
the last decades. This paper has analyzed its interplay with the politics of inequality 
and redistribution. The conventional approach to the topic has been to argue that 
decentralization causes higher levels of inequality, either by facilitating vetos 
towards redistribution or by setting the stage for a race to the bottom (Huber et al. 
1993; Peterson and Rom 1990; Peterson 1995; Proud´homme 1995; Lane and Ersson 
2000). Thus the often observed association between decentralization and inequality is 
explained as the result of an exogenous effect of the former on the latter. 
 
 The results of this paper challenge this line of argument as incomplete and 
potentially misleading. Specifically, I have argued that decentralization has 
distributive consequences that are contingent upon the existing structure of 
inequality. Because of such contingency, actors anticipate the distributive effects of 
different institutional designs and, thereby, inequality becomes a determinant of the 
institutional choice. The paper has been able to show empirically that such 
institutional choice reflects to a large extent the existing structure of inequality. In 
other words, decentralization is indeed endogenous with respect to the territorial 
component of the distribution of income.  
 
 These conclusions on the particular case of decentralization point to the 
convenience of a more general revision of the current understanding of the relation 
between political institutions and social outcomes. Observed associations may well 
be reflecting processes of historical self-selection, rather than exogenous effects, in 
many other realms. 
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APPENDIX I: VARIABLES DESCRIPTION AND SOURCES 
 
 The purpose of this Data Appendix is to present the sources and to describe 
the construction of the variables used in the statistical analyses carried out in the 
paper. With varying degrees of incidence of missing values across the variables, the 
dataset contains information for the period 1980-1997 for 15 OECD countries24. The 
Variables are presented in alphabetical order. 
 
Between-Group Share of the Theil Index. 
 
Variable constructed by the author. The Theil Index is part of a family of 
measurements of inequality called single parameter Generalized Entropy class GE 
(α), for α= -1, 0, 1, 2. The more positive α is, the more sensitive GE(α) is to income 
differences at the top of the distribution; the more negative α is, the more sensitive it 
is to differences at the bottom of the distribution. GE(0) is the mean logarithmic 
deviation, GE(1) is the Theil Index, and GE(2) is half the square of the coefficient of 
variation. The values of the GE measures vary between 0 and ∞, with 0 representing 
an equal distribution and higher values representing higher levels of inequality. In 
addition to satisfying the standard properties of inequality measures (namely, Mean 
Independence, Population Size Independence, Symmetry and the Pigou-Dalton 
Transfer sensitivity), the Theil Index is characterized  by the fact that it is additively 
decomposable, as explained in the text. More formally, the measurements of 
inequality that belong to the Generalized Entropy class are given by: 
 
( ) 2
1
1 1 1
n
i
i
yGE
n y
α
α α α =
  = −  −    
∑  
 
And more specifically, for α=1, the Theil Index is given by: 
 
( )
1
11 ln
n
i i
i
y yGE
n y y=
   = ⋅      ∑ , 
 
where the first term represents the weight, i.e., the share of aggregate income 
of  the group(s) of interest, in this case regions, and the second term represents the 
income of the individual relative to the mean. This means that the Theil Index is a 
weighted geometric average of the income relatives. See Beramendi (2003) for a 
more detailed description of the calculation procedures. 
 
Coefficient of Variation in Regional Unemployment Rates. 
  
 Variable constructed by the author. By regional it is meant a level of 
government similar to the German or Austrian Länder, the Canadian Provinces, the 
American States, the Spanish Comunidades Autonomas, the French or Italian regions 
                                                          
24 These countries are: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Italy , Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, UK and USA. 
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or, if not self-evident,  their closest administrative equivalent available, as in the case 
of Scandinavian nations. Sources: EUROSTAT-New Cronos Database (NUTS-3 
regions); and estimates obtained from the labor force surveys (various years) run by 
the following statistical offices:  Statistics Canada; Bureau of the Census; Australian 
Bureau of Statistics; Statistics Finland; Statistics Norway; Statistics Denmark; 
Statistics Sweden. See Beramendi (2003) for a list of the administrative division 
available in the case of Scandinavian nations.   
 
Decentralization of Redistribution. 
Variables constructed by the author. The IMF Yearbooks of Government Financial 
Statistics (1975-1999) provide the raw material for the construction of a number of 
indicators measuring the proportion of revenues and expenditures in the hands of the 
different levels of government. In fact, as to expenditures, they do even collect data 
about their allocation by function and level of government. On the basis of these 
data, the decentralization of redistribution is defined as the  regional share of total 
social expenditures. 
 
 
Ethnic Fractionalization. 
From all the alternatives available in the literature (Laitin 2000: 142-155) I have, 
conventionally, adopted the one that measures ethnic fractionalization as one minus 
the sum of squared population proportions in each "ethnolinguistic" group, where the 
groups were originally defined according to the 1960 Soviet Ethnographic Atlas. The 
final figure represents the probability that two people drawn randomly are from a 
different ethnic group since the sum of squared population proportions is the 
probability that two random people are from the same group. 
 
 
Government  Partisanship 
This is an index of the partisan left/right “center of gravity” developed by Cusack 
(1997) . It is based on  Castles and Mair' s (1984) coding of government parties' 
placement on a left right scale, weighted by the decimal share of cabinet portfolios. 
The variable ranges from 0 (extreme right) to 4 (extreme left). 
 
 
Market and Disposable Income Inequality: Gini Coefficient 
Variables constructed by the author. The Gini Coefficient ranges between 0 
(perfectly egalitarian society) and 1 (perfectly inegalitarian society). The Gini 
coefficient is based on the Lorenz curve, a cumulative frequency curve that compares 
the distribution of a specific variable (income) with the uniform distribution that 
represents equality (in this case, the 45º line). Intuitively, in order to obtain the Gini 
coefficient, graph the cumulative percentage of households (from poor to rich) on the 
X axis and the cumulative percentage of income on the Y axis. In this way, the 
Lorenz curve is obtained. The Gini coefficient is simply the ratio between the area of 
the distribution between the 45ºline and the Lorenz curve on the one hand and the 
total area of the distribution on the other. More formally, the Gini coefficient is given 
by 
 
Gini  ( ) 1 1
1
2 1
n n
i j
i j
y y
n n y = =
= −− ∑∑  
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which represents the average absolute distance between any two individuals 
randomly selected. The Gini is calculated for the two following income concepts: 
 
Market=    GWS + SEI + CPI, where  GWS stands for gross wages and salaries 
(earnings), SEI stands for self-employment income and CPI refers to cash property 
income.  
Disposable=   Market + TR -TX , where TR is the sum of all transfers received by 
the working age population and TX stands for the sum of social security 
contributions and income tax.  
 Only the working age population is considered, i.e., only people aged 16 to 
59 are included. The following equivalence scale has been used: (1 + CH*0.3 + (N-
CH-1)*0.4)/1.7, where N represents the number of people in the household and  CH 
the number of children under 18. See Beramendi (2003) for a more detailed 
explanation of the calculation procedures. 
 
GDP:  Real GDP per capita in 1985 US$. Source: Penn World Tables. 
(http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu). 
 
Trade Openness. It is defined as the sum of total imports and exports on good and 
services as a percentage of GDP. Source: OECD, National Accounts, Part II: 
Detailed Tables (various years). 
 
 
Union Density 
The variable measures employed union members as a percentage of the employed 
labor force. The variable is available in the Huber, Ragin and Stephens (1997) 
Comparative Welfare States Data Set, Northwestern University and University of 
North Carolina. Original data come from Visser J. (1989, 1996). 
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